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CLOSED-END FUND IPO CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Benjamin P. Edwards*  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
While closed-end funds (CEFs) have a long history, relatively recent 
research in economics and finance has provided new insights about these 
funds.  This essay explains the unique structure of CEFs and argues that absent 
a compelling reason, investors should generally avoid purchasing CEF shares 
in an initial public offering (IPO). 
Few investment options seem less attractive than buying the shares of a 
closed-end fund in an IPO, particularly if similar CEFs already exist.  Indeed, 
the continuing existence of CEFs has puzzled economists for decades.  
Because the IPO shares are sold at a premium and will soon trade at a 
significant discount, economists cannot discern any good reason why a rational 
investor would purchase CEF shares in an IPO instead of purchasing the shares 
of a CEF already on the market.1  If no rational investor would buy CEF shares 
during an IPO, then CEFs should eventually cease to exist because new CEFs 
would not be created.2  Yet CEF IPOs persist, and stockbrokers continue to 
sell CEF shares to retail investors, despite a long record of underperformance.3   
                                                 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law.  
J.D., Columbia Law School.  Special thanks to Elissa J. Germaine, Cathy Hwang, 
Mark A. Summers, and Juliette Metelus for comments on earlier drafts.  
1. See Charles M. C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  Closed-
End Mutual Funds, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 153 (1990) [hearinafter Anomalies] (“So, puzzle 
one:  Why does anyone buy these funds when they are first issued?”); Charles M. C. 
Lee, Andrei Shleifer & Richard H. Thaler, Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End 
Fund Puzzle, 46 J. FIN. 75, 75 (1991) [hereinafter Investor Sentiment] (“Few problems 
in finance are as perplexing as the closed-end fund puzzle”). 
2. See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, Charles M. C. Lee & Paul J. Seguin, The Marketing of 
Closed-End Fund IPOs:  Evidence from Transactions Data, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 
127, 127 (1996) (“in a rational expectation equilibrium, these [CEFs] should not get 
started at all”). 
3. One recent study revealed that when compared against CEF shares already on the 
market (seasoned shares), shares purchased during a CEF IPO underperformed 
seasoned shares by 8.52% after six months and 11.05% after one year.  DIANA SHAO, 
CLOSED-END FUND IPOS: SOLD NOT BOUGHT (Aug. 27, 2015) (unpublished 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2762334 
284 CLOSED-END FUND IPO [Vol. 22 No. 3  
This essay breaks down some of the unique characteristics of CEFs and 
their IPOs.  It then turns to consider whether broker-dealer firms conducting 
CEF IPOs act in a manner consistent with their customers’ best interests.  
Ultimately, I argue that the sale of CEF IPO shares appears difficult to 
reconcile with the best interests of retail investors.   
 
 
I. CLOSED-END FUND CHARACTERISTICS 
 
A CEF is an investment company that differs from more common open-
end mutual funds in important ways.4  Unlike the ordinary open-end mutual 
fund, a CEF does not continually offer shares for investors to purchase.  
Rather, a CEF sells a fixed number of shares at one time.5  If the CEF’s 
investors seek to liquidate their holdings, they must find another market 
participant to buy their shares.  A CEF share’s value is determined by the 
supply of and demand for the CEF share.  The CEF does not sell any assets to 
redeem shares until some later point when it may liquidate or convert into an 
open-end fund.  This means that the market sets the price for a CEF’s shares 
and that it may differ significantly from the net asset value (NAV) of the assets 
held by the CEF.6  In contrast, the price of an ordinary mutual fund’s shares is 
set by the value of its assets, which are sold or purchased as money flows out 
of or into the fund.  This means that investors holding ordinary mutual fund 
shares may sell their shares in exchange for a payment approximating the 
mutual fund’s NAV.  This is not always the case with CEFs, which frequently 
trade at a discount to NAV because the secondary market value for CEF shares 
frequently settles at some point significantly below the CEF’s NAV. 
 
 
                                                 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652432 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.265 
2432. 
4. For a description of the difference, see Daniel S. Alterbaum, Control Share Acts, 
Closed-End Funds, and the Battle for Corporate Control, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
310, 316 (2012). 
5. See SEC, Closed End Fund Information, FAST ANSWERS, available: 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfclose.htm (last modified Jan 16, 2013). 
6. A fund’s NAV is calculated by dividing the funds asset value by its number of shares 
outstanding.   
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A.  The CEF Initial Public Offering Puzzle 
 
CEF IPOs puzzle economists because the public pays more for a CEF’s 
shares than the value of the assets held by the CEF.  Put differently, investors 
purchasing CEF shares in an IPO seemingly pay more for the shares than they 
are worth.7 Creating a CEF is not costless.  The overall underwriting and 
promotion expenses may reach about eight percent of the offering price.8  After 
raising these funds and paying offering expenses, the CEF uses the remaining 
proceeds to buy its portfolio of securities—assets which already have 
established market values.  This raises an obvious question: why would any 
rational person pay $100 for $92 of assets? What justifies this significant 
premium? 
If a CEF’s shares increased in value after the IPO, that price increase could 
explain why investors would pay a premium for shares.  But this is not what 
happens.  CEF IPOs differ significantly from the IPOs of the securities of 
traditional industrial issuers, i.e., firms that produce goods for sale.  When an 
industrial firm goes public, the securities offered in the IPO usually increase 
in price by a significant amount, rewarding purchasers and making the decision 
to purchase IPO shares rational.9  In contrast, CEF IPOs generally provide their 
purchasers with zero first day returns because the CEF shares do not ordinarily 
trade for an amount greater than the CEF’s net asset value.   
The different first day behavior for industrial firm IPOs and CEF IPOs 
makes intuitive sense.  When an ordinary business sells shares to the public in 
an IPO, no established market value for the firm exists.  As the shares begin to 
trade, the market sets a price for the shares and values the company.  To induce 
investors to purchase the shares at the IPO, industrial firms ordinarily price 
their IPO shares at something below anticipated market price.  When the shares 
hit the market, they frequently trade up—which is to say that the shares 
appreciate in price as other market participants bid to acquire the shares 
because they view the IPO price to be less than the firm’s intrinsic value—or 
at least the value other market participants will likely assign it.  In contrast, a 
CEF generally purchases financial assets that already have established market 
values; the CEF’s shares do not ordinarily trade up.  This indicates that market 
                                                 
7. Anomalies, supra note 1, at 162 (“To explain why investors buy funds initially at a 
premium one needs to have noise traders, or ‘suckers,’ who are sufficiently optimistic 
to buy overpriced assets”) (emphasis added). 
8. Hanley et al., supra note 2. 
9. Hanley et al., supra note 2 (“While industrial IPOs have an average initial day return 
of approximately sixteen percent, closed-end fund IPOs show zero first-day returns”). 
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participants do not view the CEF’s creation as transformative enough to justify 
paying more than $100 per share for approximately $92 of net asset value per 
share.     
 
 
B.  The Puzzling Discount 
 
The decision to purchase shares in a CEF IPO appears even more puzzling 
because the shares that are first sold at a premium soon sink to trade at a 
discount to the CEF’s NAV as the fund seasons.10  A “seasoned” CEF is one 
that has already been on the market for some time and is generally trading at a 
discount. 
Why seasoned CEFs trade at a discount also puzzles economists because 
a CEF’s assets have established market prices.  When a seasoned CEF owns 
$92 of securities, a rational investor would seemingly want to buy a CEF share 
if it were priced below $92 because the investor would be able to acquire $92 
worth of assets for something less than $92.  Despite this, CEFs normally trade 
at significant discounts after six months, often as much as 10% or more.11  
While a variety of explanations for the usual discount and occasional premium 
have been proffered by academics, the discount phenomenon is so well 
established that the Securities and Exchange Commission requires CEF issuers 
to state that CEFs normally trade at a discount in their prospectuses.12   
If, for some rational reason, an investor wanted to buy the shares of a CEF, 
the choice between buying IPO shares and seasoned shares appears clear.13  If 
shares of a similar, seasoned CEF may be acquired at a discount, no rational 
investor should purchase shares in a CEF IPO.  Investors purchasing in the 
IPO essentially forgo the opportunity to acquire a seasoned CEF at a discount 
and instead purchase an unseasoned CEF at a premium.  To illustrate the 
decision, an investor purchasing shares in a CEF IPO may pay $100 for $92 
worth of assets with a near certainty that she will only be able to sell her 
                                                 
10. Of course, CEF shares may also trade at a premium to NAV but do so much less 
frequently. 
11. See Edward S. O’Neal, Closed-end Fund IPOs, SEC. LITIG. AND CONSULTING 
GRP., at 2 (2007), http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/Closed%20End%20Fund 
%20IPOs.pdf. 
12. Registration Form For Closed-End Management Investment Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 6842, 1989 WL 257682 (SEC) (July 28, 1989). 
13. See Shao, supra note 3 (documenting the remarkable underperformance of CEF 
IPO shares when compared to similar, seasoned CEF shares). 
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interest in the CEF at a discount, e.g. for $82, after a holding the CEF for six 
months.  In contrast, had the investor purchased a similar, seasoned CEF share 
at a discount in the market, she could have acquired a similar pool of assets 
with a NAV of $92 for only $82.  It could be rational for an investor to 
purchase these discounted shares if she would be able to hold the CEF until it 
liquidates or converts into an open-ended structure, allowing investors to 
redeem their shares for NAV. 
 
 
C.  The Price Stabilization Problem 
 
CEF IPOs are also unique because of the time it takes for the discount to 
emerge.  This gap reveals that extensive price stabilization occurs in the weeks 
following the IPO with the lead underwriter or underwriters seemingly 
supporting the price for an initial period.14  While ordinary industrial firm IPOs 
quickly move to an efficient market price, most of the price decline for CEF 
shares occurs somewhere between 30 and 100 days after the IPO.15  
Initial price supports delay the inevitable adjustment to a fair market price.  
Illustrating the extent of price supports, one recent study found that “the ratio 
of the volume of seller-initiated to buyer-initiated trades on the first day is 
approximately 19:1.”16  This high sell-to-buy ratio indicates that, while many 
CEF IPO purchasers quickly dump their shares during the initial period, the 
market provides few willing buyers other than the underwriter providing price 
supports.17  This rush of initial sales creates a problem for the underwriters 
providing financial support.  If too many initial investors are “flippers” 
(persons that immediately sell IPO shares), it may be too costly for an 
                                                 
14. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 2 (“We also observe several indicators of 
considerable price stabilization”) (emphasis added). 
15. See Kathleen Weiss, The Post-Offering Price Performance of Closed-End Funds, 
18 FIN. MGMT. 57 (1989). 
16. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 15 (further explaining that “when foreign country 
funds are removed from the sample [of CEF IPO transaction data] the [sell to buy] 
ratio exceeds 70:1”). 
17. One additional factor causing the delay may be the inability of market participants 
to short the CEF as soon as it begins to trade.  It generally takes at least a month for a 
CEF’s shares to be formally delivered to broker-dealers and thus available for other 
investors to borrow and short. 
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underwriter to sustain price supports.18 
Yet, why become a flipper with CEF IPO shares?  Why would an investor 
pay a premium over NAV for IPO shares only to sell them back after the IPO 
for the same price-supported purchase price?  What profit could come from 
this rapid turnover?  One possible explanation is that brokers employed by 
members of the underwriting syndicate—particularly those members not 
providing the price support—may sell to flippers “to quickly collect the selling 
fees.”19  The flippers may agree to buy for two reasons:  (i) a quick sell during 
the price stabilization period carries little risk; and (ii) brokers may “promise 
favors, including large allocations in future underpriced IPOs.”20  Thus, 
flippers may be seeking to profit not from the CEF IPO but from their 
relationship with a particular broker.  By helping a broker obtain a large 
commission, the investor may curry favor and gain access to underpriced IPOs. 
Buying back IPO shares from these flippers costs the underwriters money.  
Why do lead underwriters provide this price stabilization?  There are at least 
three reasons for underwriters to stabilize secondary market prices for an initial 
period.  First, a stable price may protect the “lead underwriter’s relationship 
with investors as well as its reputational capital.”21  Second, a delayed drop 
may obscure reality—that the CEF’s shares were overpriced in the IPO.  
Finally, the actual cost of price support may be mitigated if, anticipating a 
barrage of flippers, the underwriters sold more shares than actually issued, 
giving the underwriters a net short position that may be covered by buying 
back flipper shares post IPO.22  Correctly anticipating flipper volume allows a 
lead underwriter to sustain price supports and avoid the reputational stigma 
associated with an immediate decline in price.23 
                                                 
18. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
19. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
20. One additional possibility is that some flippers may agree to purchase after the 
broker promises to split the generous selling commission.   
21. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 6.  For a discussion illustrating the vital 
importance of reputation in a different economic context, see Jamila Jefferson-Jones, 
A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings Analysis to Reputational Damage 
Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 497, 527 (2013). 
22. For a description of the techniques underwriters use to manage the costs of 
flipping, see Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 8-10 (describing the use of the over-
allotment or “green shoe” option). 
23 See Shao, supra note 3, at 4 (“To delay and camouflage the price decline, 
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D.  Institutional Investors Avoid CEF IPOs 
 
While price stabilization delays the decline and obscures the overpriced 
nature of CEF IPO shares, it does not induce all investors to buy CEF IPOs.24  
Recent empirical information regarding CEF holders tends to confirm the 
impression that sophisticated investors do not purchase CEF shares in IPOs.25  
The evidence indicates that “institutional ownership in recent CEF IPOs is 
extremely low compared to operating company IPOs.”26  This means that, 
when institutional money managers evaluate investment opportunities, they 
generally pass on CEF IPOs.27 
 
 
E.  Other Unique Attributes 
 
To be sure, the closed-end fund structure does offer certain unique 
attributes that are not available to open-end funds—attributes which might 
theoretically justify a decision to pay a premium.  For instance, unlike an open-
ended fund, a closed-end fund does not have to liquidate investment positions 
when a shareholder wants to sell.28  This allows CEFs to take less liquid 
positions without fear that investor demands for return of capital will force 
                                                 
underwriters provide price support.”). 
24. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 725 (2003) (“institutions 
hold only a very small percentage of closed-end mutual fund shares, leaving individual 
investors as the central clientele for this type of investment.”). 
25. See Shao, supra note 3. 
26. Id. at 3. 
27. If an institutional money manager purchased and held CEF IPO shares, they would 
underperform and likely attract less capital than their competitors.  See Ronald J. 
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 893 
(2013) (“For-profit institutions like mutual funds have learned that investors follow 
relative performance and direct assets accordingly.”). 
28. See John P. Freeman, Stuart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory 
Fees: New Evidence and A Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 153 (2008) 
(“closed-end funds feature less liquidity pressure than mutual funds since their shares 
are not redeemable, and new shares are not constantly being sold.”).  
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them to liquidate their positions.  While CEFs have the ability to take these 
less liquid, longer-term positions, one recent study found that, in practice, 
CEFs tend to hold more short maturity assets than open-ended funds.29 
CEFs may also employ more leverage than open-ended mutual funds.30  
Funds using more leverage may experience higher returns and greater 
volatility and risk. 
 
 
II. CLOSED-END FUND IPOS & INVESTOR INTERESTS  
 
Sales to retail customers are currently governed by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority’s controversial “suitability” standard.31  Rather than 
attempting to parse the precise meaning of the suitability standard,32 this essay 
simply considers whether recommending CEF IPO shares is generally 
consistent with most retail investors’ best interests in light of the arguments 
frequently proffered to justify CEF IPOs.  
It appears difficult to reconcile most sales of CEF IPO shares with the best 
interests of investors, raising questions about why the offerings occur.  
Economists and other experts studying the products have theorized that the 
                                                 
29.  See Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Christopher R. Blake & Or Shachar, Why 
Do Closed-End Bond Funds Exist? An Additional Explanation for the Growth in 
Domestic Closed-End Bond Funds, 48 J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 405 
(2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591157. 
30. For a discussion about how closed-end funds may use more leverage than open-
ended funds, see  LOIS YUROW, TIMOTHY W. LEVIN, W. JOHN MCGUIRE & JAMES M. 
STOREY, MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 32:4 (2015). 
31. For discussions about the distinctions between a best interests Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority’s current suitability standard, see Benjamin P. Edwards, 
Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will A Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make A 
Material Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 111 (2014); Christine Lazaro & 
Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for 
Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 66-67 (2014) (“the 
Suitability Rule does not explicitly provide that a Broker’s recommendations must be 
in the customer’s best interests”). 
32. For an analysis and authority that the suitability standard requires 
recommendations consistent with customers’ best interests, see James S. Wrona, The 
Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment 
Advisers and Broker-Dealers and A Framework for Enhanced Investor Protection, 68 
BUS. LAW. 1, 19 (2012) (collecting authority). 
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CEF IPO shares are bought by “noise traders, or ‘suckers,’ who are sufficiently 
optimistic to buy overpriced assets.”33  Some assert that “[i]nvestors who wish 
to hold closed-end funds should never buy them at the IPO and the suggestion 
that they should by financial advisors is suspect.”34  If only a “sucker” would 
buy the overpriced asset, there may not be a reasonable basis for concluding 
that the purchase is consistent with an investor’s best interests.  
 
 
A.  Eventual Positive Share Price Return 
 
Still, some weak arguments for buying CEF IPO shares have been made.  
For instance, to educate the public, one financial firm provides articles about 
CEFs in the “Learning Center” portion of its website.35 One article contends 
that it would be “unwise” for investors to pass on CEF IPO because “[a] study 
we conducted of all CEF IPOs from Jan. 1, 2001, through Oct. 31, 2011, found 
that 73.7% of the IPOs had positive share price total returns since inception.”36  
Based on this “limited study,” the article’s authors make the interestingly-
phrased claim that they do not believe “that investing in CEF IPOs, in general, 
is a fool’s game.”37  
Given the dynamics discussed above, the meager prospect of eventual 
positive share price returns does not seem appealing.  Consider what eventual 
positive share price returns means in the context of the hypothetical CEF IPO 
                                                 
33. Anomalies, supra note 1, at 162 (noting that “[i]t helps to have a gimmick” such 
as a famous asset manager). In the economics literature the term “noise trader” is 
frequently used as a euphemism for idiot. Lawrence Summers famously “began a 
paper on finance by declaring: ‘THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.’”  Paul 
Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. MM36, Sept. 2, 
2009, available http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-
t.html?_r=0 (explaining that “the preferred term in academic literature” for idiots is 
“noise traders”). 
34. See O’Neal, supra note 11, at 2. 
35. Morningstar, Closed-end fund IPO Premium (2012), https://www.fidelity.com/ 
learning-center/investment-products/closed-end-funds/ipo-premium. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. The article also stresses that “[j]ust because a CEF is suitable for your portfolio 
doesn’t mean it’s in your best interests. There’s a large difference between the 
suitability and fiduciary-duty standards.”  Contra Wrona, supra note 32, at 55 (arguing 
that “the widely held belief that broker-dealers are subject to substantially lower 
standards of conduct is illusory”). 
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discussed above.  At the IPO, the investor pays $100 for a share.  After 
subtracting commissions and offering expenses, the CEF purchases $92 of 
assets per share.  Even though the CEF only holds $92 of assets per share, the 
underwriter will likely stabilize the price for the first three months, after which 
the market will adjust and the CEF’s shares will most likely trade at a discount 
to the CEF’s NAV, meaning that if the CEF has $92 of net assets per share, 
the market price on offer to buy a share may be only $82.  As months pass into 
years, the CEF’s underlying investments may perform well and the CEF’s 
NAV may rise significantly, perhaps even to $112 of NAV per share.  If the 
CEF still trades at an approximate 10% discount, the market may then offer 
more than $100 per share—yielding the positive share price return. 
Plainly, investor interests would be better served by purchasing the shares 
of CEFs already trading at a discount or by purchasing a lower-cost open-end 
fund that could be liquidated at something near NAV.  At the least, fairly 
evaluating whether an investor should buy a CEF IPO share requires some 
comparative assessment to other products on the market.  Here, CEF investors 
could buy seasoned CEF shares instead and experience a near certainty of 
significantly higher returns than they would obtain by buying unseasoned 
shares during the IPO.  As mentioned earlier, one recent study found that CEF 
IPO shares underperformed comparable seasoned CEF shares by 11.05% after 
one year.38  Given the performance differential, recommending IPO shares 
over similar, seasoned shares appears most likely to lead to significant 
underperformance.   
 
 
B.  Purported Long-Term Structural Benefits 
 
Other arguments fail to address the IPO problem.  For example, in defense 
of CEFs, generally, some supporters have contended that the CEF structure 
allows CEFs to take longer-term positions than could be taken with the 
redemption demands facing open-ended funds.  Unlike open-end funds, CEFs 
do not need to unwind long-term positions if panicky investors seek to redeem 
their shares.  This argument misses the point because it does not justify the 
purchase of CEF IPO shares whenever similar funds already trade at a 
discount.   
Additionally, most CEFs may not actually use their purported ability to 
take longer-term positions.  CEFs’ actual holdings tend toward shorter-
                                                 
38. See Shao, supra note 3, at 1. 
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maturity assets.39  A CEF IPO featuring short-maturity strategies and holdings 
should not attempt to justify its existence by pointing out that it has the 
structural ability to do something it does not intend to do. 
 
 
C.  Managerial Skill 
 
Some CEF IPOs have been justified by claims that the exceptional talent 
of the manager retained to manage the CEF’s assets justifies the premium.40  
While this remains a theoretical possibility, it would require the accurate 
identification of a truly exceptional manager, one capable of rapidly 
outperforming the difference between the IPO premium and the seasoned CEF 
discount.  Even if such a manager were identified, it would still appear 
preferable to wait until the fund seasoned and began to trade at a discount. 
 
 
D.  Unusual Market Circumstances  
 
In limited circumstances, CEF IPOs might appear less ill-advised.  For 
example, in times of high investor sentiment, seasoned CEFs have been known 
to trade at premiums to their NAV.  While this does not occur regularly, it does 
happen and is associated with increased CEF IPO offerings.41  When similar, 
seasoned CEFs trade at a premium, the value differential between IPO shares 
and seasoned shares diminishes.  This, of course, does not mean that it is in an 
investor’s best interests to purchase CEF shares in an IPO. The vast majority 
of the time, CEFs trade at a discount and CEF shares purchased in an IPO will 
most likely move to trade at a discount in the future.       
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Institutional investors generally pass on CEF IPOs for good reasons.  The 
IPO shares tend to significantly underperform existing CEF shares and other 
mechanisms for gaining exposure to the underlying asset classes, such as 
                                                 
39. See Elton et al., supra note 29. 
40. See SIMON LACK, WALL STREET POTHOLES 27 (Wiley 2015) (explaining that 
“[i]t’s generally the dumb money that buys a CEF IPO at” issue price). 
41. See Investor Sentiment, supra note 1 (arguing that CEF discounts and premiums 
may be used to measure investor sentiment). 
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buying open-ended funds that already exist.  Moreover, the problems with CEF 
IPOs have been known, studied, and discussed for decades in the finance and 
economics literature.  Given this reality, the continued sale of CEF IPOs to 
retail investors does not appear aligned with their best interests. 
